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Abstract
Healthcare settings have been identiﬁed as preferential for the transmission of many agents causing highly infectious diseases (HIDs).
Infection control procedures strongly reduce the risk of transmission of HIDs in hospital settings, when adequately applied. The main
objective of the European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases (EuroNHID), a network co-funded by the European Commission, is
to assess the current capabilities for dealing with HIDs in Europe, speciﬁcally in the context of infection control and healthcare worker
(HCW) safety, through conducting an on-the-ﬁeld survey of high-level isolation units (HLIUs)/referral centres for the management of
HIDs in participating countries. During the ﬁrst year of the project’s activities, speciﬁcally designed, evidence-based checklists were
developed. This review introduces the EuroNHID checklists as a standard tool for the assessment of hospital capabilities concerning
infection control and HCW safety in the management of patients with HIDs, and presents preliminary results from ﬁve HLIUs.
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Introduction
High-level isolation units (HLIUs) are clinical facilities speciﬁ-
cally designed to provide high-quality patient care while mini-
mizing nosocomial transmission of highly contagious and
hazardous diseases, in order to protect healthcare workers
(HCWs), other patients, and the entire population. Speciﬁc
consensus statements for the design and operation of HLIUs
have been recently issued by panels of experts from both
the USA and Europe [1,2].
The European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases (Eu-
roNHID) project, a network co-funded by the European Com-
mission (EC), began its activities in 2007 with the objective of
assessing current capabilities in dealing with highly infectious
diseases (HIDs) in Europe, speciﬁcally in the context of infec-
tion control procedures and HCW safety, through on-the-ﬁeld
surveys of HLIUs/referral centres for the management of HIDs
in participating countries. In order to perform this survey, dur-
ing the ﬁrst year of the project’s activities, speciﬁcally
designed, uniform checklists were developed.
This review introduces the EuroNHID checklists as a stan-
dard tool for the assessment of hospital capabilities concern-
ing infection control and HCW safety in the management of
patients with HIDs, and presents preliminary results from
ﬁve HLIUs.
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Methods
National public-health authorities in countries that have, or
are planning, an HLIU were contacted by the Coordination
Team, with the help of the EC, and asked to suggest
(although not formally to endorse) physicians with expertise
in HID/HLIU management as national representatives.
EuroNHID includes national representatives from 15 mem-
ber states (Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland,
Slovenia, Spain and UK) and is coordinated by the Italian
National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI) ‘L. Spallanza-
ni’, Rome, Italy. Most of the participants are clinicians working
in HLIUs or centres designated for referral of patients with
HIDs, who, as a whole, have backgrounds in infectious diseases
(IDs), intensive care, infection control, pulmonary medicine,
occupational health, and public health. A project Steering Com-
mittee was constituted at the beginning of the project.
A networking strategy was adopted in order to develop
the checklists. During a preliminary meeting (Rome,
22 October 2007) with the Steering Committee, topics and
items to be explored in the checklists were selected, starting
from participants’ experiences, available literature, prepared-
ness plans, as well as guidelines of international authorities
for the management of HIDs. The list of selected topics and
items was approved by all national representatives. Each
main topic was then assigned to a Steering Committee
member with speciﬁc expertise, who drafted a preliminary
checklist. Advanced checklist versions were developed in
order to incorporate comments, suggestions and additional
evidence from all participants. Final agreement was reached
during a general meeting (Rome, 10–11 April 2008). The
checklists were developed as standard and shared survey
tools and are not intended to set forth mandatory require-
ments or establish a national standard for legal preparedness.
In order to check the applicability of these checklists, the
Coordination Team and the Steering Committee decided to
perform a pilot phase of the survey, applying the checklists
in their own HLIU/referral centre. Moreover, we also con-
tacted the staff of another HLIU in Sweden, which is not
included in the project, and asked them to apply the check-
lists, as an external control.
Results
EuroNHID checklists
Three different checklists have been developed, including 44
items and 148 speciﬁc questions. The main areas explored were:
Checklist 1, hospital resources: infrastructure (including
location, capacity and infrastructures), technical aspects
(including technical infrastructures, control and maintenance
issues, availability of medical equipment, diagnostic capability),
personnel availability, and an optional section on infection
control in the Emergency Department/Medical Admission
Department.
Checklist 2, hospital procedures: administrative aspects,
management of personal protective equipment (PPE) (includ-
ing selection, donning and removal procedures, and supply-
ing), hand hygiene (including speciﬁc procedures and
existence of adequate technical features), prevention of nee-
dle-stick injuries (including existence of adequate devices),
transportation of patients (including logistic and technical
aspects), routine hygiene and disinfection, waste management
(including logistic and technical features), post-mortem pro-
cedures, surge capacity procedures.
Checklist 3, HCW safety: organizational and administrative
aspects of HCW safety (including services available, proce-
dures of assessment of safety culture and climate), medical
aspects of HCW safety (including pre- and post-exposure
management), education and training of HCWs.
Complete checklists are available online, at the European
Network of Infectious Diseases (EUNID) website (http://
www.eunid.eu), after registration, in the page ‘Documents’.
Pilot phase
The ﬁnal version of the checklists was applied in HLIUs in
France (Marseille), Germany (Frankfurt), Italy (Rome), Swe-
den (Linko¨ping) and the UK (London). The resources/proce-
dures/capabilities available in the unit are brieﬂy described
below.
Bio Safety Level 3 ward of the infectious disease and
tropical medicine service, CHU Nord AP-HM, Marseille,
France (Fig. 1)
The HLIU in Marseille was built in 2005, and is located in a
separate building, connected with a bridge to the main gen-
eral, university hospital. It is also routinely used for other ID
patients.
Four single rooms and two double rooms are available.
Two single rooms are provided with equipment for intensive
care (IC) and are also equipped for assistance to paediatric
patients. Each room is sealed, and is provided with negative
pressure (up to )50 Pa), high-efﬁciency particulate air (HEPA)
ﬁltration of both supply and exhausted air, with 25 air changes
per hour, and an anteroom for the entire unit. Additional tech-
nical features of the unit and of the room are reported in
Table 1. Available medical equipment is summarized in Table 2.
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A Bio Safety Level (BSL) 3 referral laboratory is approxi-
mately 10 km away. In the case of HID patients, routine
haematological and biochemistry tests are performed in the
referral laboratory.
In the unit, ﬁve ID physicians, one IC specialist, eight ID
nurses, six IC nurses and four radiology technicians have
been speciﬁcally trained for dealing with HIDs, also through
participation in practical exercises. The staff, during an event
involving an HID, is totally dedicated to HID patient/s.
Some services for the safety of these HCWs are in opera-
tion within the unit: the risk manager, an infection control
team, and an occupational health service. Protocols for the
management of biological and chemical accidents, and policies
for vaccination and chemoprophylaxis of HCWs are in place
in the unit, and a service for psychological support to HCWs
involved in giving care to HID patients is available. The infec-
tion control procedures in place in the unit are summarized
in Table 3.
Infectious Disease Ward, Johann Wolfgang
Goethe-University, Frankfurt, Germany (Figs 2 and 3)
The HLIU in Frankfurt is located in a separate building and is
used on a daily basis for other ID patients. It was con-
structed in 2001, on the same site as a general, university
hospital.
In the unit, three double rooms are available for isolation
of HID patients, both for adults and children. One room is
equipped for two IC patients. Each room is sealed and is
equipped with negative pressure (up to )30 Pa), HEPA ﬁltra-
tion of supply and exhausted air, and anteroom. Further
technical features and medical equipment available are given
in Tables 1 and 2.
Diagnostic capabilities for virology (BSL 3 level only) and
bacteriology are available in the same campus, while a BSL 4
level laboratory is 80 km away. Tools for microbiology, rou-
tine haematology and clinical chemistry are available in the
patients’ rooms.
In the unit, personnel have been speciﬁcally trained for
dealing with HID patients (through a speciﬁc training pro-
gramme and participation in practical exercises at the local
and regional level), including 27 physicians covering many
medical specialties, 19 nurses, four technicians and ten
housekeeping staff. Plans are in place to ensure that, during
an HID event, the trained staff are totally dedicated to HID
patient/s. These HCWs have been selected also on the basis
of an evaluation of physical aptitude.
In order to ensure their safety, an infection control and
biosafety team are operating in the unit, and protocols for
accident management are in place. Periodically, the HCWs’
fears and concerns about HID, and the conﬁdence of HCWs
in safety policies (safety climate) are assessed, through
personal interview, anonymous questionnaire and group
discussion. Protocols for the evaluation of the health status
FIG. 1. Inside of the high-level isolation unit at CHU Nord AP-HM,
Marseille, France.
TABLE 1. Additional technical features of units and isolation rooms
CHU Nord
AP-HM, France
J. W. Goethe-University,
Germany
INMI ‘L. Spallanzani’,
Italy (currently
operating unit)
Royal Free
Hospital, UK
Linko¨ping University
Hospital, Sweden
Unit
Separate entrance for HCWs X X X X X
Separate entrance for HID patient X X X X X
Existence of security circuita and/or
security personnel
X X X
Emergency power generating system X X X X X
Pass-through autoclave/s X Xb X
Isolation room
Internal communication system X X X X X
Negative air pressure indicators X X X X X
Self-closing doors X X X X X
Private bathroom X X X X X
aA secure perimeter around the HLIU that is only accessible to members of staff/authorized personnel, consisting of a fence with or without closed circuit television (CCTV)
in the case of stand-alone units or CCTV and closed doors in the case of HLIUs integrated into other buildings.
bNot located within the facility, and not used exclusively for the unit.
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of these HCWs exist, also monitoring absence. Policies for
vaccination and chemoprophylaxis of HCWs are available. A
psychological support service for HCWs and external con-
sultants is available, too. Protocols for post-exposure man-
agement of HCWs and external consultants also exist.
Finally, many infection control procedures are in place in the
unit (see Table 3 for details).
INMI ‘L. Spallanzani’, Rome, Italy (Fig. 4)
The INMI ‘L. Spallanzani’ is an institute for research and care
dedicated to IDs, and includes a 250-bed hospital, laborato-
ries and services. The INMI is located near a general public
hospital. At the INMI site a new, separate HLIU with direct
entrance from the road is under construction. This unit
comprises at ground ﬂoor level 10 sealed single rooms, each
with a separate entrance for patients, double staff anteroom
(for entrance from and exit to staff corridor), self-closing
doors, autoclave and pass-through box. Each room has a
separate air-handling system and is equipped with negative
pressure, more than 12 air changes per hour and HEPA ﬁl-
tration of exhaust air, and can operate independently from
the others. Medical equipment and devices necessary for
diagnosis and care of the patients, including a mobile com-
puted tomography scan, are permanently located within the
unit, and dedicated to HID patients only. In the same ﬂoor
BSL 4 and BSL 3 laboratories are available. On the upper
ﬂoor, 20 single-bed rooms for isolation/quarantine of HCWs
or patient contacts are available. Speciﬁc infection control
procedures for this HLIU, which will provide the maximum
level of biosafety and biosecurity, are under development.
This new HLIU is soon available but currently, in the case
of an event, a patient will be managed in a single-bed isola-
tion unit for both adults and children, renovated in 2007,
and located in the main hospital building. This unit is not
routinely used, has separate entrances for patients and for
HCWs, and is equipped with negative pressure, more than
12 air changes per hour, HEPA ﬁltration of supply and
exhausting air, double anteroom (for entrance and exit), and
is equipped with IC capabilities. Additional technical features
of the currently operating isolation unit are given in Table 1,
while medical equipment available is given in Table 2.
BSL 3–4 laboratories are present at the INMI site, while
routine haematological and microbiology tests are performed
in the central hospital laboratory or in the BSL 3 environ-
ment, according to risk assessment.
A speciﬁcally trained task force comprising physicians,
nurses and technicians is available, and their number is ade-
quate for the current single-bed isolation unit.
An infection control team, an occupational health service
and a biosafety risk manager are in charge of HCW safety.
In the case of an HID event, speciﬁc protocols exist for
the management of many types of accident (e.g. biological
accident, fainting while wearing PPE, mechanical accident or
ﬁre in the unit) and for vaccination and chemoprophylaxis.
The conﬁdence of HCWs in safety policies, as well as
safety culture, has been assessed through anonymous ques-
tionnaire and group discussion. The health status of HCWs
is constantly monitored and psychological assistance is
available during and after an HID event. Moreover, during
the event, the staff is dedicated to HID patients only. Also,
protocols for post-exposure HCW evaluation, management
and surveillance are in place. Speciﬁc infection control pro-
cedures currently in place in the isolation unit are given in
Table 3.
Royal Free Hospital, London, UK (Fig. 5)
Recently re-built in 2008, this HLIU is located in a separate
ward within the main university hospital building, and is
reserved for HID patients.
The unit has two large single rooms (c. 100 m2), with a
single-bed ﬂexible-ﬁlm isolator equipped for IC and suitable
for both adults and children. The plastic isolator is com-
TABLE 2. Availability of medical equipments
CHU Nord
AP-HM, France
J. W. Goethe-University,
Germany
INMI ‘L. Spallanzani’,
Italy (currently
operating unit)
Royal Free Hospital,
UK
Linko¨ping University
Hospital, Sweden
Portable ultra-sonograph Xa X Xa Xa Xa
Portable X-ray X X Xa X Xa
Mechanical ventilator Xa Xa X Xa Xa
Minor surgery sets Xa Xa Xa Xa Xa
Equipment for renal replacement/CVVHDFb Xa Xa Xa Xa
ECGc X X X X X
Transesophageal Echocardiograph Xa Xa Xa Xa
Blood gas analyser Xa X X X X
Bronchoscope Xa Xa Xa Xa
Gastro-/colonoscope Xa Xa Xa
aNot permanently stationed in the unit, available ‘on call’.
bContinuous Veno-Venous Hemodiaﬁltration.
cPortable electrocardiograph, and/or monitor integrated into life-support systems.
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pletely sealed, and is equipped with four protective suites
directly attached to the longer sides of ﬂexible-ﬁlm, with the
front side within the isolator. Also, the rooms are sealed
and provided with negative pressure ()40 Pa), with more
than 12 air changes per hour, HEPA ﬁltration of incoming
and outcoming air, and two separate anterooms for the way
in and out (exit is via shower and change procedures) (1).
For other technical features and medical equipment available,
see Tables 1 and 2.
The HLIU includes an adjoining suite that contains a BSL 3
ﬂexible-ﬁlm laboratory isolator, enhanced by being of a com-
pletely enclosed (glove-box) design and having HEPA ﬁltra-
tion in the air inlet, as well as the exhaust pathway. This
laboratory provides an extensive range of pathology tests,
including haematology, biochemistry, coagulometry, auto-
mated cross-matching, blood ﬁlm and parasitology proce-
dures, bacterial cultures in a range of atmospheres and a
range of on–off serological tests. A BSL 4 laboratory for
virology is located approximately 5 km away.
Fourteen physicians (specialized in ID, IC, Microbiology
and Laboratory Medicine, Psychiatry), 33 nurses and eight
housekeeping and maintenance persons are in force at the
unit. All are trained to deal with HID patients, on the basis
of a unit-speciﬁc training programme. Some services are in
place for the safety of these HCWs (risk manager, infection
control team and biosafety manager) and protocols for the
management of many types of accidents exist. Safety culture
and safety climate in the unit are monitored through
personal interviews and group discussion, and implemented
also through the participation of HCWs in safety planning.
Moreover, for the HCWs involved in the management of an
HID event special insurance and special compensation (addi-
tional remuneration, deferral leave) are planned.
FIG. 3. Interior of the high-level isolation unit at Johann Wolfgang
Goethe-University in Frankfurt during the management of a viral
haemorrhagic fever case in 2006.
FIG. 2. Front view of the high-level isolation unit at Johann Wolf-
gang Goethe-University in Frankfurt, Germany.
FIG. 4. The high-level isolation unit currently under construction at
National Institute for Infectious Diseases ‘L. Spallanzani’, Rome, Italy.
FIG. 5. The plastic isolator (Trexler Unit) in use at Royal Free Hos-
pital, London, UK.
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The health status and absenteeism of these HCWs are
monitored, and a psychological support service is also avail-
able. Protocols for vaccination and chemoprophylaxis exist,
together with procedures for post-exposure evaluation and
management of HCWs. Table 3 shows the infection control
procedures in place in the unit.
Department of Infectious Diseases, University Hospital,
Linko¨ping, Sweden (Fig. 6)
The HLIU, built in 1997, is located on ground level within
the infectious disease ward, in an extension of the University
Hospital main building. In 2004 the security and ventilation
systems of the unit were renovated. The unit is used on a
daily basis for isolation and treatment of IDs in general.
The unit consists of three rooms, two double rooms with
IC capability and one room for laboratory facilities. Each
room has double anterooms that permit staff to enter from
the central corridor, whereas patients enter from the out-
side. When the unit is ‘activated’, entrance is not possible
from the general ward section. Staff enter the unit from the
exterior through a separate entrance to a dressing area with
shower and rest room. Each ward room is sealed with a ver-
iﬁed negative pressure gradient of )50 Pa. Incoming and out-
going air is HEPA-ﬁltered and the ventilation provides six air
changes per hour. Other technical features are included in
Table 1, while medical equipment is listed in Table 2.
A laboratory equipped within the unit is the site of all
chemical analysis, comparability tests prior to blood transfu-
sions, microbiological analysis (BSL 2), malaria rapid tests,
slides and microscopy. Bedside analysers are used for blood
gas and glucose analysis. For risk Group 3–4 agents, samples
are sent by certiﬁed couriers to the BSL 4 laboratory at the
Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control in Stock-
holm, a distance of 200 km away.
The staff of the unit are multidisciplinary and recruited
from mainly specialists in infectious diseases, intensive care
and from the different laboratory disciplines involved. All
work in the unit is voluntary and prior training in PPE is
mandatory. Approximately 60 staff persons, including doctors
and nurses, are continuously trained.
Local existing occupational health services and hospital
infection control teams are operative and the former have
preparation and experience in psychosocial debrieﬁng sup-
port. These services also provide for post-exposure manage-
ment of HCWs. The infection control procedures in place
are summarized in Table 3.
Discussion
In view of an increase in emerging diseases and HID occur-
rence and due to emerging situations such as globalization, a
substantial part of national preparedness plans and guidelines
is dedicated to isolation of cases in hospitals and establishing
criteria for hospitals in terms of structures, procedures and
staff [1–6]. Indeed, hospital capabilities, including adequate
infrastructures, infection control procedures and HCW man-
agement, are fundamental issues for HID containment.
In order to obtain effective isolation, different technical
approaches have been adopted throughout the world. In the
USA, three HLIUs are available; these units are usually con-
structed near BSL 3–4 laboratories, in order to deal with
potential laboratory-acquired infections [7]. In Europe, differ-
ent approaches exist. In some countries, HLIUs are available,
or are under construction. In the UK, ‘Trexler Units’-type
isolators, a particular type of HLIU (a negative-pressure sin-
gle-bed ﬁlm isolator, with PPE incorporated in the plastic
envelope), are in use [8]. In other countries, HLIUs do not
exist, and these patients are managed in standard negative
pressure hospital rooms. Finally, different approaches were
seen during the SARS epidemic in some countries with local
transmission, such as the creation of temporary isolation
wards, using negative pressure tents or mobile modules [9–
11]. A similar approach has sometimes been used in limited-
resource countries, for example, in order to maintain appro-
priate isolation during viral haemorrhagic fever outbreaks in
Africa [12].
The cost of these special facilities is high, both for con-
struction and for operation and maintenance, and, generally,
no ‘special’ reimbursement is planned for these patients by
Public Health Systems. Thus, some cost-saving strategies are
used. HLIUs could be used ﬂexibly, with more than one level
FIG. 6. The entrance for healthcare workers in the high-level isola-
tion unit operating at the University Hospital of Linko¨ping, Sweden.
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of infection containment, in order to also admit patients with
diseases requiring a lower level of isolation, such as TB or
other potentially severe airborne infections. Moreover,
HLIUs could also be used as an essential tool for training in
the management of HIDs, and as a site for speciﬁcally
designed simulation, both at national and international levels.
In such ways HLIUs could have multiple day-by-day function-
ality, and all the speciﬁc procedures could be continually
exercised. Formal transnational agreements for the transport
of HID patients to the nearest HLIU from countries where
these facilities are not available are advisable, but several
open questions still exist concerning the feasibility and safety
of long-distance transport of these patients, both by ground
and by air [1].
In recent years, several other networks and consensus
conferences for developing agreements on the management
of HIDs and isolation facilities have been created, both
within Europe [in particular the European Network for Diag-
nostics of ‘Imported’ Viral Diseases (ENIVD), the Inventory
of Resources for Infectious Diseases in Europe and EUNID
projects] and in the USA (the Consensus Conference on
Designing Bio-containment Units). However, from recent
public health threats, such as the SARS epidemic, we have
learned that it is important to assess the effectiveness of
infection control procedures planned by national and local
authorities, as well as to improve HCWs’ knowledge of and
compliance with safer procedures and use of devices. Indeed,
‘real-life’ obstacles in the application of these plans, together
with lack of harmonization and standards, are among the
main obstacles to effective and coordinated interventions. In
this contect, EuroNHID checklists represent a valuable com-
mon and standardized instrument for self-assessing and
implementing resources and procedures. The added value of
the project consists in providing an ‘on the ﬁeld’ evaluation
of European capabilities that could allow the transition from
a theoretical to a practical, and practicable, approach to
infection control and HCW safety in the management of
patients affected by HIDs, and from a quantitative to a quali-
tative evaluation of hospital capability in dealing with trans-
missible agents of HIDs. The survey, which is currently
on-going, will cover approximately 35 HLIUs/referral centres
in 15 European countries, and will provide a more compre-
hensive picture of European preparedness in facing HIDs.
Preliminary results are encouraging, and the pilot phase
has also demonstrated the applicability of checklists: indeed,
this initial survey, performed in ﬁve HLIUs, revealed substan-
tial harmony in infection control procedures, and evidenced
the feasibility, in real life, of these protocols and strategies.
All units have similar protocols for PPE, hand hygiene, pre-
vention of needle-stick injuries, ﬁnal disinfection, treatment
of infectious waste, transport of HID patients, and manage-
ment of human remains. Moreover, all units have in place
strategies for promoting the application of these procedures,
through a speciﬁc education programme and participation in
(and management of) exercises at local, regional, national
and international levels. Also, the medical aspects of HCW
safety are very similar: additional vaccination and chemopro-
phylaxis are available, and protocols for post-exposure man-
agement are in place. The main difference emerged as an
aspect of HCW management: special insurance and compen-
sation for those involved in the management of HID patients
are planned only in the UK. The impact of this and other
minor differences will be evaluated when the complete sur-
vey results are available.
Despite these promising results, the applicability of check-
lists requires further assessment in the other HLIUs/referral
centres: indeed, it is possible that Steering Committee mem-
bers developed the checklists with their own units in mind.
Despite the fact that an HLIU not involved in the project has
also been surveyed, a single external control is not sufﬁcient.
Another limitation is the fact that the checklists have been
applied in centres with similar levels of technology, experi-
ence and expertise in the management of HIDs. Assessment
is required in countries with different resources, experiences
and priorities, and in centres with lower levels of specializa-
tion and technology.
The survey results could be used by health authorities and
hospital administrators for the implementation and updating
of national hospital capabilities. This approach will improve
common know-how and will support those who deal with
HIDs, in order to identify aspects that require strengthening,
altering or accelerating, and to identify potential solutions.
Acknowledgements
We thank R. Iacovino for her support throughout the pro-
ject, and F. N. Lauria for his contribution and critical reading.
Other members of the EuroNHID Study Group are: O.
Adrami, Hellenic Centre for Disease Control and Prevention,
Athens, Greece; Michael Borg, St Luke’s Hospital, Malta; R.
Gottschalk, Public Health Ofﬁce, Frankfurt am Main, Ger-
many; R. Hemmer, Centre Hospitalier de Luxembourg, Barb-
le´, Luxembourg; A. Horban, Hospital of Infectious Diseases,
Warsaw, Poland; M. Kojouharova, National Centre of Infec-
tious and Parasitic Diseases, Soﬁa, Bulgaria; C. Perronne,
Unite´ des Maladies Infectieuses–Hoˆpital Universitaire Ray-
mond Poincare´, Paris, France; J. Lambert, University College
of Dublin, Dublin, Ireland; H. Siikama¨ki, Helsinki University
Central Hospital, Helsinki, Finland; P. Skinhoj, Rigshospitalet,
718 Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Volume 15 Number 8, August 2009 CMI
ª2009 The Authors
Journal Compilation ª2009 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 15, 711–719
Copenhagen, Denmark; F. Strle, University Medical Centre,
Ljubljana, Slovenia; A. Trilla, University of Barcelona, Barce-
lona, Spain; N. Vetter, Otto Wagner Spital, Vienna, Austria.
Transparency Declaration
This work was partly supported by the EC grant EuroNHID
(2006205), and by the Ministero della Salute, Italia-Ricerca
Corrente, Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientiﬁco.
References
1. Bannister B, Puro V, Fusco FM, Heptonstall J, Ippolito G; EUNID
Working Group. Framework for the design and operation of high-
level isolation units: consensus of the European Network of Infec-
tious Diseases. Lancet Infect Dis 2009; 9:45–56.
2. Smith PW, Anderson AO, Christopher GW et al. Designing a biocon-
tainment unit to care for patients with serious communicable
diseases: a consensus statement. Biosecur Bioterror 2006; 4: 351–365.
3. WHO. Infection prevention and control of epidemic- and pandemic-prone
acute respiratory diseases in health care. WHO interim guidelines. June
2007. Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/
WHO_CDS_EPR_2007_6c.pdf (last accessed: 20 January 2009).
4. CDC. Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infec-
tious Agents in Healthcare Settings 2007. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention; 2007. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/
pdf/guidelines/Isolation2007.pdf (last accessed: 20 January 2009).
5. Jensen PA, Lambert LA, Iademarco MF, Ridzon R; CDC. Guidelines
for preventing the transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in
health-care settings, 2005. MMWR Recomm Rep 2005; 54:1–141.
6. European Commission. Summary of EU waste legislation. Available at:
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s15002.htm (last accessed: 20 January
2009).
7. Marklund LA. Patient care in a biological safety level-4 (BSL-4) envi-
ronment. Crit Care Nurs Clin North Am 2003; 15: 245–255.
8. Crowcroft N, Brown D, Gopal R et al. Current management of
patients with viral haemorrhagic fevers in the United Kingdom. Euro
Surveill 2002; 7: 44–48.
9. Fung CP, Hsieh TL, Tan KH et al. Rapid creation of a temporary iso-
lation ward for patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome in
Taiwan. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2004; 25: 1026–1032.
10. Parmar HA, Lim TC, Goh JS, Tan JT, Sitoh YY, Hui F. Providing opti-
mal radiology service in the severe acute respiratory syndrome out-
break: use of mobile CT. AJR Am J Roentgenol 2004; 182: 57–60.
11. Svoboda T, Henry B, Shulman L et al. Public health measures to con-
trol the spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome during the
outbreak in Toronto. N Engl J Med 2004; 350: 2352–2361.
12. Jeffs B, Roddy P, Weatherill D, et al. The Medecins Sans Frontieres
intervention in the Marburg hemorrhagic fever epidemic, Uige,
Angola, 2005. I. Lessons learned in the hospital. J Infect Dis 2007;196
Suppl 2:S154–S161.
CMI Fusco et al. Assessment of high-level isolation units 719
ª2009 The Authors
Journal Compilation ª2009 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 15, 711–719
